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Were Banks Really at the Center of the
Prewar Japanese Financial System?
Juro Teranishi
For many years, the dominant view of the Japanese financial system before World War II
has been that industrial bank-type banks were at the center, and research emphasizing the
role played by capital markets has generally been in the minority. Recent years, however,
have seen the publication of research highlighting the development of prewar stock 
markets, which has sparked a debate challenging the accepted theory. This paper contains
a comprehensive reconsideration of the roles played by banks and stock markets from both
a quantitative and a qualitative perspective. On the quantitative side, it examines the
structure of assets and liabilities in the private nonfinancial sector and long-term data 
on fund-raising by major manufacturing and public-sector enterprises. It concludes that
while the private nonfinancial sector was in general strongly dependent on bank borrow-
ings, when the focus is narrowed to large enterprises there was a high degree of dependence
on equity fund-raising. While diachronic trends can be seen in these characteristics, it is
clear that they stem from differences in data coverage and not from any basic changes in
systems. On the qualitative side, the paper compares the roles played by banks and stock
markets in two areas: resource allocation functions (information production functions
and risk-bearing functions) and corporate governance functions. While stock markets 
did play some role in corporate governance, the paper concludes that resource allocation
functions were only exhibited within a narrow group of wealthy individuals. On the other
hand, banks played a large role in resource allocation functions by supplying risk money,
but the paper concludes that their corporate governance functions were insufficient.
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During the high-growth period from the 1950s to mid-1970s, the Japanese financial
system was an intermediary financing system led by banks. Household-sector assets
were held primarily in the form of bank deposits and the corporate sector—larger
enterprises as well as small and medium-sized companies—raised funds primarily
through bank borrowings. The functions of the stock market were largely attenuated
by cross-shareholding, while those of the bond market were dampened by government
regulation. Individual investors did not bear the risks of investment; rather, banks had
the role of reducing risk by diversifying their lending based on an unwritten guarantee
that the state would protect deposits. The rights of shareholders were restricted by
cross-shareholding arrangements, and there was limited room for the functioning 
of investor rights in corporate governance. On the contrary, corporate governance 
was achieved via internal rules on managers and the supervision of main banks. The
question posed by this paper is whether the financial system before World War II 
was led by banks to a degree similar to that during the high-growth period or if, 
conversely, it was led by the equity and capital markets.
The dominant view in academic history is that the financial system was very 
similar to a German-style industrial bank-led system. The classic example is the
“organ banking” theory advocated by Kato (1957) and others. Yamaguchi (1966,
1970, 1974) analyzes equity investments by merchants and landlords in the financial
history of the textile industry and emphasizes the large role played by the flow of
funds mediated by banks and supported by Bank of Japan (BOJ) credits. However,
Shimura (1969) argues that after World War I stock markets played an important 
role in marshaling social capital, and Sugiyama (1970, 1976) and Tsurumi (1983)
emphasize the importance of the initial development of capital and currency markets
in the period before World War II. More recently, Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) find 
a “culture” of using equity markets for corporate finance and governance in the 
prewar period.
1
Based on this academic history, the argument is between the position of Ishii
(1997, 1999), who argues that the financial system before World War II was by nature
a bank-led system of indirect finance, and the position of Okazaki (1993), Okazaki
and Okuno (1993), and Okazaki, Hamao, and Hoshi (2005), who argue that it was 
a system led by capital markets, primarily corporate finance in the stock market. 
The disagreement between the two positions goes beyond comparisons of mere 
quantitative roles to include the qualitative capabilities and evolution of banks and
securities. However, at the core of the conflict is a difference in the basic attitudes 
of the two sides regarding how to view the economic system before World War II.
Ishii’s argument begins by assuming the backwardness of Japanese capitalism, and
emphasizes the lack of development of leading country-style markets and the necessity
of state intervention. Conversely, Okazaki and his colleagues argue that Japanese 
economic development was institutionally similar to European and U.S. development
and that there was a global standardization of economic systems. In other words, this
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1. Teranishi (2003) contains a critical evaluation of the argument by Hoshi and Kashyap (2001).is a form of historical view based on modernization theory that searches for historical
evidence of modern market evolution.
2
I have commented on this question in the past in Fujino and Teranishi (2000) and
Teranishi (2005a). In those papers, I argued that in quantitative terms the large enter-
prise sector was heavily dependent on equities for its fund-raising, but, looking broadly
at the macro-level, private, nonfinancial sector, the degree of financing from bank 
borrowings was every bit as high as after the war. The purpose of this paper is to 
provide as comprehensive an organization of the quantitative data on the financial 
system before World War II as possible to elucidate the implications of this position
and, to supplement these quantitative observations, to attempt a multifaceted evalua-
tion of the facts pertaining to the qualitative functions of banks and equity markets to
arrive at a complete picture of the nature of the prewar financial system.
Section II contains comparisons from a quantitative perspective, examining in more
detail the quantitative data published in Fujino and Teranishi (2000). Section III looks
at the qualitative aspects of risk bearing, information production, and corporate 
governance. Finally, Section IV summarizes the main conclusions. The observations on
capital markets in this paper are limited to equity markets only. The author intends to
analyze questions regarding short-term money markets and bond markets in a separate
paper. Below, the author attempts to examine the issues as factually as possible without
delving into the differences in economic viewpoints and models between the backward
capitalism theory and the globalization theory. Higher-order observations regarding
differences in models will be left as a future topic.
II. Examination from the Quantitative Side
This section compares intermediary financing mechanisms provided by banks and 
others and market-based financing mechanisms provided by equities and others to
arrive at a quantitative picture of the level and scope of enterprise-sector fund-raising.
In the analysis below, fund-raising includes owned capital, that is, equities held by 
shareholders and cash retained on hand. In other words, “fund-raising” for the purposes
of this section refers to the entire spectrum of fund-raising, whether from external or 
internal sources. The first step is a comparison of the fund-raising methods of the 
various sectors comprising the enterprise sector, following which is an examination of
the diachronic changes in fund-raising methods across the entire period before World
War II (primarily after the “Matsukata deflation” engineered by Finance Minister
Masayoshi Matsukata in 1881–85).
A. Sectoral Comparisons
The sectoral analysis considers the private nonfinancial sector, the overall large enter-
prise sector, the large manufacturing enterprise sector, and the indigenous commercial
and industrial sectors.
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2. From the perspective of the former, the financial system during the high-growth period can be seen as a continua-
tion from the period before World War II, while from the perspective of the latter, it stems from a disturbance in
the path to modernization caused by the exogenous shock of the war.We begin by considering the broadest concept of the enterprise sector, using money
flow tables to examine the fund-raising of the private nonfinancial sector. Money
flow tables are a system of describing the flow of funds between sectors by financial 
instrument, dividing macro-level economic sectors into financial, government, private
nonfinancial, and foreign sectors. For the private nonfinancial sector, the BOJ has
money flow tables for the postwar period that cover the corporate enterprise sector 
and the individual sector (household sector and individual enterprise sector, primarily
agriculture and smaller enterprises), but for the period before World War II the 
only tables available aggregate the entire private sector. Therefore, the private non-
financial sector data used here represent not only large incorporated entities (joint-stock
companies and limited/unlimited partnerships, etc.), but also individual enterprises
and family production organizations in such sectors as agriculture and indigenous 
commerce and industry as well as the household sector.
Table 1 contains comparisons of the outstanding liability structure for the private
nonfinancial sector, and Table 2 contains leading-enterprise fund-raising structures for
both all industries and the manufacturing sector only. These comparisons yield the
following insight.
(1) Compared to major-enterprise fund-raising, borrowings were more prevalent
and equities less common in the fund-raising of the private nonfinancial sector.
The share of borrowings in the fund-raising of the private nonfinancial sector was
generally between 40 percent and around 70 percent, while for major enterprises in all
industries borrowings were 2–7 percent of liabilities and bills payable 5–10 percent,
for a total of only 8–17 percent. The same contrast can be seen from the ratio of 
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Table 1  Debt in the Private Nonfinancial Sector
Average of the composition ratio of balances in the period, percent
Ratio of 
Equities Corporate Borrowings Investments Calls and borrowings to 
bonds others equities and 
investments
1886–90 24.7 0.0 71.1 0.0 4.1 3.18
1891–95 38.4 0.0 59.2 2.4 0.0 1.55
1896–1900 35.3 5.1 57.8 1.6 0.2 1.43
1901–05 32.8 5.4 59.7 2.2 0.0 1.57
1906–10 26.8 6.6 62.1 4.4 0.0 1.86
1911–15 26.6 6.7 60.7 6.0 0.0 1.83
1916–20 31.6 5.4 57.5 4.3 1.3 1.58
1921–25 35.7 6.9 50.2 5.8 1.3 1.18
1926–30 35.2 7.5 46.6 10.1 0.6 1.09
1931–35 37.6 7.7 41.9 11.7 1.0 0.93
1936–40 42.1 5.6 40.2 11.0 1.1 0.85
Note: Percentages of equities, corporate bonds, borrowings, investments, and calls and others to the
total. Percentages are the averages of the composition ratios of each year in the period.
Borrowings include discount bills by banks and other financial institutions.
Source: Fujino and Teranishi (2000, appendix).borrowings to equities/investment finance in Table 1 and the ratio of borrowings and
bills payable to equities in all industries in Table 2. The former is between 0.85 and
3.18, while the latter is only between 0.1 and just over 0.3.
It should be noted, however, that private nonfinancial sector borrowings are 
estimated from financial institution data and figures include both bank loans (loans
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Table 2  Fund-Raising by Leading Enterprises 
[1] All Industries
Average of the composition ratio of balances in the period, percent
Ratio of
Equities Reserves Corporate Borrowings Bills borrowings and
bonds payable bills payable
to equities
1902–05 66.2 16.7 9.0 2.5 5.6 0.12
1906–10 63.8 17.9 8.5 3.0 6.8 0.15
1911–13 62.1 17.8 10.7 3.3 6.0 0.15
1914–15 56.7 16.3 12.2 6.3 8.6 0.26
1916–20 55.7 22.9 11.7 2.6 7.1 0.17
1921–25 55.9 19.1 13.4 4.5 7.1 0.21
1926–27 51.6 13.2 21.8 6.1 7.4 0.26
1928–30 51.0 11.2 20.9 6.9 10.1 0.33
1931–35 52.4 11.1 21.6 7.0 8.0 0.28
1936–40 53.9 14.1 15.8 7.0 9.0 0.30
[2] Manufacturing 
Average of the composition ratio of balances in the period, percent
Ratio of
Equities Reserves Corporate Borrowings Bills borrowings and
bonds payable bills payable
to equities
1902–05 59.0 10.3 6.3 7.6 16.8 0.41
1906–10 55.7 18.0 8.0 4.6 13.7 0.33
1911–13 54.4 17.6 12.8 3.7 11.6 0.28
1914–15 54.2 14.7 10.2 6.7 14.2 0.39
1916–20 50.2 24.0 11.0 2.5 12.4 0.30
1921–25 48.6 25.3 9.7 4.0 12.4 0.34
1926–27 44.3 20.3 17.8 5.2 12.5 0.40
1928–30 49.8 15.2 15.3 8.9 10.8 0.40
1931–35 54.4 17.0 13.6 7.6 7.5 0.28
1936–40 55.3 18.7 8.8 8.6 8.5 0.31
Note: Composition ratios of equities, reserves, corporate bonds, borrowings, and bills payable to the
total. Composition ratios are the averages of the composition ratios of each year in the period,
which are calculated based on the average of the first-half and second-half amounts in each year.
Ratios are calculated based on data for 51 to 52 companies in the Osaka Stock Exchange’s
Kaisha-Soran (Annual Corporation Reports) between 1902 and 1913, and on data for 53 to 
80 companies in Toyo Keizai Shimposha’s Jigyo-Gaisha Keieikoritsu no Kenkyu (Survey on the
Managerial Efficiency of Business Corporations) and Toyo Keizai Kabushiki-Gaisha Nenkan
(Annual Survey of Joint-Stock Companies) between 1914 and 1927, as well as on aggregated
data by industry in Mitsubishi Keizai Kenkyusho’s Honpo Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki (Business
Analysis of Japanese Enterprises) for 1928 and thereafter.
Source: Fujino and Teranishi (2000).on deeds, loans on bills, etc.,) and bill discounting. On the other hand, in major
enterprise data, loans from banks and others are posted as borrowings and bill issuing
volumes are posted as bills payable, making it unclear to what extent banks and others
discounted bills. Nonetheless, business practices at the time indicate that the majority
of the bills written by enterprises were probably discounted by banks, making it 
reasonable to conclude that Table 1’s borrowings correspond conceptually to the sum
of Table 2’s borrowings and bills payable. The major enterprises covered in Table 2 are
all joint-stock companies, and the equity figures represent paid-in capital. However,
during the period before World War II, entities other than joint-stock companies
accounted for a large share of major incorporated entities, the prime example being
the zaibatsu holding companies that existed through the 1920s. For example, in 1925
Japan had a total of 17,600 joint-stock companies, with average paid-in capital 
per company of ¥542,000, with another 11,500 limited partnerships and 5,200
unlimited partnerships, each with average investments per partnership of ¥64,000 and
¥171,000, respectively (Teranishi [2003, p. 24]). Table 1 includes the investment 
figures for these non-joint-stock entities.
(2) At least until the 1920s, equities accounted for a higher proportion and 
borrowings/bills for a lower proportion of fund-raising for “all industries” than
for “manufacturing.”
Comparing major enterprises in “all industries” and “manufacturing” in Table 2,
the ratio of equities between 1902 and 1905 was 66.2 percent for the former but 
only 59.0 percent for the latter, a clear difference. This gap continued until the 
1920s, although it did gradually decline. Conversely, the ratio of borrowings and 
bills payable was lower for the “all industries” category than for “manufacturing,”
again with the gap gradually closing but continuing until the 1920s. Differences
between all industries and manufacturing can also clearly be seen in the ratio 
of borrowings and bills payable to equities. Until the 1920s, the ratio was between 
12 percent and 26 percent for all industries, but between 30 percent and 41 percent
for the manufacturing sector.
The differences between the private nonfinancial sector and major industries seen
in (1) and (2) above and also the differences within leading enterprises between the
all-industries statistics and the manufacturing statistics stem primarily from differ-
ences in the coverage of the data. First, ignoring the factor of external fund-raising by
households, the differences between the private nonfinancial statistics and the leading
enterprises statistics derives from the fact that while the leading enterprises represent
large, modern companies, the private nonfinancial sector contains an overwhelming
number of indigenous micro-producers—individual enterprises and family produc-
tion organizations in traditional commerce, industry, and agriculture. In the economy
before World War II, agriculture, forestry, and fishing accounted for 41 percent of real
GDP in 1888, declining gradually to 24.7 percent in 1920 and 15.9 percent in 1938.
These indigenous micro-producers raised virtually no funds in the form of equities,
which meant that they were extremely dependent on borrowings, which presumably
raised the ratio of borrowings to equities/investments for the private nonfinancial 
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3 Turning to the differences between all-industries and manufacturing statistics
for leading enterprises, the following reasons are probably at work. The all-industries
statistics in Table 2 include not just manufacturing but also leading enterprises 
in broadly defined public services such as electricity (electric power), gas, electric 
railways, and marine transportation. These broadly defined public services enjoyed
high name recognition and quasi-public utility status, so from the onset they were
able to raise the majority of their capital from the capital markets. For example,
around 1897 some 92.6 percent of the funds raised by railway companies were in the
form of (paid-in) equity. For other sectors, the figures were 55.1 percent for spinning,
64.6 percent for food processing, 71.1 percent for chemicals, 57.8 percent for glass
and ceramics, 72.5 percent for metals, and 66.3 percent for machinery (Teranishi
[1982, p. 209]). As Table 3 shows, this trend did not change after World War I.
Comparisons of the fund-raising by manufacturing sectors in 1926–27 and that by
broadly defined public services such as electric power, electric railways, and marine
transportation during the same period clearly show the former group to have a higher
ratio of borrowings and bills payable to equities, while the latter group had a higher
ratio of equities. It should also be noted that corporate bonds accounted for a 
relatively high 17.8 percent of manufacturing fund-raising, while the figure was low
for electric railways and marine transportation. Electric power, however, was a high
31.7 percent, but this figure included large amounts of foreign currency raised
through bond issues.
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Table 3  Fund-Raising of Leading Enterprises by Industry in 1926 and 1927 
Average of the composition ratio of balances in the period, percent
Ratio of
Equities Reserves Corporate Borrowings Bills borrowings and
bonds payable bills payable
to equities
Manufacturing 44.3 20.3 17.8 5.2 12.5 0.40
Cotton spinning 47.9 32.8 9.4 3.6 6.3 0.21
Shipbuilding 30.7 19.6 26.9 1.9 21.0 0.76
Chemical fertilizers 47.9 5.7 23.6 11.6 11.2 0.47
Cement 57.4 6.8 22.2 6.8 6.8 0.24
Paper 41.3 9.2 30.3 9.7 9.6 0.47
Sugar 45.4 19.1 12.4 3.8 19.4 0.42
Beer 50.4 35.6 8.6 0.9 4.5 0.11
Milling 28.1 7.5 14.3 7.3 42.9 1.81
Electric power 54.9 3.0 31.7 6.6 3.7 0.19
Electric railways 66.4 8.0 10.1 12.1 3.4 0.23
Marine transportation 55.3 37.1 8.1 1.4 1.2 0.05
All industries 51.6 13.2 21.8 6.1 7.4 0.26
Source: Fujino and Teranishi (2000).
3. As will be seen later in this paper, it was rare for the traditional micro-producers to borrow money directly from
banks. The vast majority came via merchants and landlords in a multitiered system of financial intermediation. The
borrowings in Table 1 flowed from the banks, through the merchants and landlords, to the indigenous commerce
and industrial sector.B. Chronological Comparisons
This paper has demonstrated that, in quantitative terms, the capital and equity 
markets played a major role in the fund-raising of large enterprises in Japan before
World War II, while bank lending played an important role in financing indigenous
producers. The next question to be addressed is whether there were specific periods in
which market-based or intermediary financing played particularly large roles and
whether there was a tendency for the quantitative share to increase over time. More
specifically, Ishii (1997) argues that banks took on an extraordinarily large role during
the “industrial revolution period” (1886–1907).
4 In terms of trends, Okazaki, Hamao,
and Hoshi (2004) maintain that banks played a comparatively large role during the
industrial revolution period but that they were gradually supplanted by the capital
markets, and find that a long-term marketization of the financial system took place
during the period before World War II. On the other hand, Ishii (1999) argues that
the financial system before World War II was basically led by banks even though the
bank-centered circulation of funds experienced a temporary “paralysis” during the
financial crisis of the 1920s.
Let us begin by considering the industrial revolution period. According to Table 1,
between roughly 1886 and 1910 the share of borrowings was far larger than that of
equities. However, it should also be noted that in Table 1 the share of equities soared
from 24.7 percent during the 1886–90 period to 38.4 percent during the 1891–95
period. The importance of equities during the initial industrial revolution period is
clearly demonstrated by the flow-side perspective on private nonfinancial sector fund-
raising provided in Table 4, and this was what resulted in the phenomenon seen
between 1881 and 1885 in which the share of equities was actually larger than that of
borrowings. (Note that “equities” here does not include equities issued by banks and
other financial institutions.) This is because large enterprises were established during
the first half of the industrial revolution and much use was made of equities as a means
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Table 4  Debt in the Private Nonfinancial Sector
Composition ratio of flow in the period, percent
Equities Corporate  Borrowings Investments Call loans 
bonds and others
1887–90 41.1 0.2 58.7 0.0 0.0
1891–95 48.6 6.3 45.2 0.0 0.0
1896–1900 28.9 0.5 62.3 8.2 0.0
1901–05 22.7 6.1 65.1 6.2 0.0
1906–10 23.8 9.9 55.8 10.5 0.0
1911–15 25.7 7.4 62.8 4.1 0.0
1916–20 41.0 2.4 47.9 5.9 2.7
1921–25 23.0 15.8 51.2 8.7 1.3
1926–30 45.4 26.4 25.1 8.9 –5.7
1931–35 68.8 14.1 0.0 10.2 6.9
1936–40 42.8 11.5 46.0 –1.0 0.7
Source: Fujino and Teranishi (2000).
4. Okazaki, Hamao, and Hoshi (2005) accept this argument with the “restriction” that the role of equities can be ignored.to finance them. As is well known, there was an initial boom in enterprise establish-
ment between 1887 and 1889, followed by the recession of 1890, and then from 1893
to about 1895–96 there was a second boom. These new startups ranged from public-
oriented industries such as railways and electric power to manufacturing segments such
as spinning, paper, sugar, cement, shipbuilding, and steel. After establishment, these
enterprises most likely made use of bank borrowings for their operating capital.
Nonetheless, it is important to remember that their establishment itself relied primarily
on equities.
5 However, economic development during this period consisted not only 
of the establishment of large, modern enterprises but also rapid development of
indigenous commerce and industry, primarily in agriculture and allied sectors.
Undoubtedly, much of the development of indigenous industries was driven by
expanding demand from the newly established enterprises. However, another major
factor (until 1897) was the decline in the relative value of silver against gold under 
the silver standard, which caused exports of indigenous products to grow. Yet another
reason was the expansion of indigenous industries’ domestic and international markets
as Japan began to enhance its infrastructure. The development of these indigenous
industries certainly would have required large amounts of operating capital in addition
to capital investments, and the majority of this money was financed either directly 
or indirectly through bank borrowings.
6 That is why banks played such a large role
during the “industrial revolution” period. Therefore, we can also say the following:
(3) Banks undoubtedly played a large role during the industrial revolution period,
but this primarily reflects the funding demands of the indigenous sector 
and operating capital borrowings of the modern manufacturing sector and 
others; equity investment played a large role in supplying the initial funding 
for the early stage of the industrial revolution through the establishment of
modern enterprises.
Let us now turn to a discussion about trends. Table 1contains the ratio of borrowings
to equities/investments, which serves as an indicator of the relative sizes of the capital
markets and banks. During the initial period, the figure declined rapidly from 3.18 to
1.43, following which there was a short uptrend,
7 and then beginning in 1920 the
trend again turned downward. Figure 1, which contains values for each year, confirms
this observation. It seems to imply that banks played a strong role until about the 1910s,
but from that point until the 1930s the role of equities became stronger. Looking next
at ratios of borrowings and bills payable to equities for leading enterprises in all 
industries, found in Table 2, one can again observe a long-term uptrend. Figure 2, 
containing annual values, clearly confirms the uptrend. What this seems to imply is
that while major enterprise fund-raising through banks was low overall, it did expand
with time.
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5. We will examine the issue of equity-secured financing later in this paper.
6. The majority of capital investment funding in the traditional sector is assumed to have been covered by cash on hand.
7. The decline in the ratio from 1886 to 1896 was due to the large number of modern enterprises established during
this period, as discussed above.We cannot necessarily assume that these interpretations are correct. Let us first
look at Table 5, which contains ratios of borrowings and bills payable to equities for
major enterprises broken down by industrial sector. Note that overall there are no 
significant changes in trends for individual manufacturing sectors. To confirm this, we
turn to the annual values in Figure 2 for the ratio of borrowings and bills payable to
equities in manufacturing industries. While there are some cyclical movements, there
58 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MARCH 2007
Figure 1  Ratio of Borrowings to Equities and Investments in the Private 
Nonfinancial Sector













Source: Fujino and Teranishi (2000, appendix).
Figure 2  Ratio of Borrowings and Bills Payable to Equities in Leading Enterprises















Source: Fujino and Teranishi (2000).are no significant changes in the trend. Therefore, the changes in the all-industries,
major-enterprise ratio of borrowings and bills payable to equities do not presumably
represent changes in the dependence of individual sectors or enterprises on capital
markets but either changes in the industrial structure—the relative sizes of broadly
defined public services versus manufacturing—or bias in the sample enterprises. To
confirm this, we calculated the ratio of total assets (aggregate of equities, reserves,
bonds, borrowings, and bills payable) for manufacturing (as discussed in Fujino 
and Teranishi [2000]) to total assets for all industries at the points at which the raw
data change: 1902, 1913, 1914, 1927, 1928, and 1940. Table 6 compares this to the
ratio of industrial capital to all-industries capital as found in corporate statistical
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Table 5  Ratio of Borrowings and Bills Payable to Equities
Ratio of the average of the composition ratio in the period, percent
1902–05 1906–10 1911–13 1914–15 1916–20 1921–25 1926–27 1928–30 1931–35 1936–40
Manufacturing 0.41 0.33 0.28 0.39 0.30 0.34 0.40 0.40 0.28 0.31
Cotton spinning 0.46 0.27 0.30 0.41 0.17 0.13 0.21 0.11 0.09 0.43
Shipbuilding — — — 0.76 0.59 0.57 0.76 0.70 0.34 0.28
Chemical fertilizers — — — 0.32 0.20 0.46 0.47 0.51 0.42 0.38
Cement — — — 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.24 0.23 0.15 0.16
Paper — — — 0.43 0.23 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.15
Sugar — — — 0.26 0.37 0.36 0.51 0.58 0.39 0.23
Beer — — — 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.11 — 0.11 0.13
Milling — — — 1.09 1.47 1.91 1.81 1.70 1.63 1.55
Electric power 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.20 0.05 0.15 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.09
Electric railways 0.01 0.08 0.12 0.25 0.15 0.11 0.23 0.34 0.44 0.37
Marine transportation 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.26 0.19 0.27
All industries 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.26 0.17 0.21 0.26 0.33 0.29 0.30
Source: Fujino and Teranishi (2000).
Table 6  Check of Sample Bias
Ratio of manufactured 
products to the sum of 
Ratio of manufacturing to all  Ratio of manufacturing manufactured products 
industries in total capital in  to all industries in capital in  and transportation,
Fujino and Teranishi (2000) Business Corporate Statistics telecommunications, and 
public utility products in 
current prices
1902 0.28 0.20 0.94
13 0.39 0.39 0.91
14 0.52 0.41 0.89
27 0.45 0.39 0.87
28 0.44 0.39 0.87
40 0.63 0.52 0.93
Notes: 1. Data from Fujino and Teranishi (2000) are data for the first half in each year.
2. Data fromBusiness Corporate Statistics are from the BOJ’s Honpo Shuyo Keizai Tokei
(Hundred-Year Statistics of the Japanese Economy). Capital is paid-in capital up to 1914 
and investments or authorized capital thereafter. “All industries” includes finance, commerce,
agriculture, and so on.
3. Products in current prices are from Choki Keizai Tokei (Long-Term Economic Statistics) 
Vol. 1, tables 12 and 17.tables.
8 Both series move in more or less the same manner. In other words, the changes
in the ratio of all-industries, major-enterprises borrowings to total borrowings and
bills payable likely were not caused by sample bias. Therefore, the long-term uptrend
in the all-industries borrowing/bills payable ratio in Figure 2 likely reflects the higher
share occupied in the industrial structure by manufacturing, which was dependent
primarily on borrowings. However, we should also note that the ratio of borrowings
and bills payable to equities for the electric railway and marine transportation sectors
(Table 5) rose rapidly between the late 1920s and the 1930s. The reason for this will
have to be the subject of a future inquiry. Suffice it to say that this is why in the 1930s
both ratios virtually overlap in Figure 2. These points lead us to argue the following:
(4) The diachronic rise in the dependence of all-industries major enterprises on
borrowings and bills payable reflects the increasing share of manufacturing in
the industrial structure.
Let us now consider trends in the ratio of borrowings to equities/investments in the
private nonfinancial sector, as found in Table 1 and Figure 1. Although we do not have
data on the dependence of indigenous micro-producers on borrowings, we consider it
reasonable to assume that the level was virtually 100 percent and did not change very
much over time. Meanwhile, as seen above, in the modern, large enterprise sector the
ratio of borrowings and bills payable to equities increased over time reflecting the grow-
ing share of manufacturing. According to Nakamura’s (1973) hypothesis, the ratio of
indigenous industries to all industries was constant (equilibrium growth for indigenous
and modern industries) until World War I, but entered a decline (disequilibrium
growth) thereafter. This leads to the following conclusion. The dependence of the 
private nonfinancial sector on borrowings rose through World War I reflecting the 
rising share of manufacturing, which is highly dependent on borrowings, within 
the modern industries sector. However, dependence on borrowings in the private 
nonfinancial sector declined thereafter in spite of the rising share of manufacturing in
the modern industries sector due to the declining share of indigenous micro-producers
entirely dependent on borrowings. Therefore the changes after World War I found 
in Table 1 and Figure 1 do not necessarily imply that modern, large enterprises made
greater use of capital markets. Okazaki, Hamao, and Hoshi (2004) use data similar to
those found in Table 4 to argue that, from a long-term perspective, the capital markets
replaced the functions of banks during the period before World War II, but our 
observations above indicate that this view may not necessarily be convincing.
We can summarize our findings to this point as follows:
(5) The decline in the dependence on debt in the private nonfinancial sector after
World War I reflects changes in the industrial structure due to the waning of
the indigenous sector and does not necessarily reflect a greater utilization of
capital markets on the part of individual modern industrial enterprises.
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8. As a reference, Table 6 also shows the ratio of manufacturing-industry production (current-year prices) to the aggregate
production value for manufacturing and transportation/telecommunications/public utilities. This ratio differs 
substantially from the other two series, a reflection of the significant differences in capital coefficients.III. Examination from the Qualitative Side
Now let us move to the qualitative investigation. In this section, we will examine the
roles played in resource allocation and corporate governance by intermediary financing
mechanisms (primarily banks) and market-based financing mechanisms (primarily
equities). For resource allocation, three questions must be addressed. First, how effective
were banks and equity markets in providing information on investment opportunities?
Second, to what extent did the two mechanisms bear investment risks for the economy
as a whole? And third, what levels of households’ preferences were reflected in the
resource allocations by the two mechanisms? For corporate governance, we compare
banks’ ability to monitor the enterprise sector with that of shareholders. We also 
consider the innovations made by shareholders to reduce agency costs in enterprise 
control. Obviously, given the current levels of research and data availability, it is impossi-
ble to arrive at satisfactory answers for all of these questions. The observations that 
follow attempt to delineate concepts regarding these issues and provide tentative 
comparisons based on current research findings.
A. Comparison of Resource Allocation Efficiency
We begin by considering the role played by banks in resource allocation. Information
production is the first topic, regarding which the following point can be made:
(1) In addition to servicing part of the demand for funds among modern enter-
prises, primarily in manufacturing, banks supplemented money lenders and
other informal means of finance and functioned, in fact, as the sole supplier of
funds for indigenous micro-producers. However, it is doubtful that banks 
produced sufficient information in regard to the allocation of funds.
First, with respect to lending to modern enterprises, there is the problem of the
agency nature of the “organ bank.” Banks did not so much lend money based on their
own subjective decisions as respond passively to the demand for funds among affili-
ated nonfinancial enterprises. Obviously, banks at this period in time had very little
dependence on real estate collateral compared to the period after World War II.
9
However, “lending on credit” and equity-secured lending to wealthy individuals were
probably mostly “connected lending” between the banker and the individual.
We must also note that lending to indigenous micro-producers involved a two-tier
or two-step structure
10consisting of lending from the bank to a major merchant or land-
lord and then lending from the merchant or landlord to the micro-producer. Sectoral
breakdowns of banking services clearly demonstrate this. As can be seen from Table 7,
the commerce sector accounted for more than 50 percent of bank lending through the
1920s. The vast majority of lending to the commerce sector went for advances to micro-
producers: loans from grain merchants or fertilizer merchants to farmers, or loans from
textile merchants or thread wholesalers to weavers and silk producers. Landlords and
money lenders also borrowed funds from banks and lent them to farmers, and so on.
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9. However, real estate collateral was used extensively in rural areas where little other collateral property was available.
10. Teranishi (1982) refers to this mechanism as “multiple intermediary finance.”In other words, rather than building up their own information, banks used the infor-
mation networks of merchants and landlords when making loans to indigenous 
commerce and industry. Teranishi (1991, 1994) attempts to measure the strength 
of the information networks of merchants, landlords, and money lenders, and by 
extension the limits to the information functions of banks. Both of the papers use 
prefectural cross-sectional data from the 1920s to estimate demand functions for loans
from money lenders. The demand functions depend on the availability of alternative
financing from banks and credit unions, and others, as well as interest rates and other
control variables. These estimations
11 indicate that credit unions were very much in
competition with money lenders, but make it clear that a long period of information
accumulation was required before bank lending could compete with money lenders. 
To add a bit more detail, in the initial period after a bank branch was opened in a 
prefecture, the bank was unable to compete with money lenders, and indeed was 
unable to effectively lend to rural areas until 17–19 years had elapsed.
The following point can be made regarding risk bearing by banks:
(2) Little of the risk of supplying funds through banks was reduced by the 
banks themselves using the law of large numbers; most of the risk was borne 
by depositors.
In theory, banks have the ability to collect micro-funds from depositors and reduce
risks by diversifying borrowers. During the period before World War II, banks’ risk
reduction functions were insufficient in two aspects. First there was the problem of the
agency nature of the “organ bank.” Most banks tended to concentrate on supplying
funding to specific enterprises or regions at the sacrifice of the benefit of diversifi-
cation. Second, banks themselves tended to be under-funded, in part because of the
large numbers of small banks that had been established. This meant that they were
unable to respond adequately to the funding demands of increasingly large, highly
creditworthy borrowers, and as a result may have been unable to enjoy the benefits of
diversification.
12 Table 8 compares the distribution of sizes for banks, listed companies,
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Table 7  Ratio of Bank Lending by Industry
Percent
Commerce Industry Agriculture
1893 49.2 1.0 5.6
97 63.7 1.2 8.3
1926 50.4 18.6 7.6
28 71.8 7.4
38 42.1 22.4 5.8















11. As a specific measure of a bank’s capability to produce information, the papers use the average number of years
from the establishment of a bank branch in the prefecture.
12. Shimura (1969) focuses on this point and argues that their small size prevented banks from moving into equity
underwriting, as a result preventing Japanese banks from following the path to investment banking that was seenand joint-stock companies. In 1934, the size distribution of banks was roughly the
same as for all joint-stock companies. Companies with more than ¥10 million in 
capital represented 58.0 percent of the former and 61.2 percent of the latter. However,
many of the listed companies were quite large, with those capitalized at ¥10 million or
higher accounting for 81.3 percent of the total. While companies capitalized at 
¥50 million or higher accounted for 32.2 percent of the banks, they accounted for 
48.1 percent of the listed companies, nearly half. By contrast, only 8.8 percent of listed
companies were capitalized at ¥5 million or less, while 28.3 percent of banks were.
Unfortunately, there are no usable data available on listed-company size distribution in
1921. However, we can infer that the gaps in the size distribution between banks and
63
Were Banks Really at the Center of the Prewar Japanese Financial System?
in the United States. However, large banks such as Yasuda and Mitsui moved aggressively into bond underwriting,
so there is room to reconsider Shimura’s hypothesis.
Table 8  Authorized-Capital Distribution of All Joint-Stock Companies, 
Listed Companies, and Ordinary Banks in 1921 and 1934
[1] 1921
All joint-stock companies Ordinary banks
Number of Composition  Number of Composition 
companies ratio of capital  banks ratio of capital 
(percent) (percent)
–¥100,000 6,643 1.7 295 0.6
¥100,000–500,000 6,267 8.1 606 5.2
¥500,000–1 million 2,122 8.2 469 11.3
¥1–5 million  2,222 25.6 371 26.3
¥5–10 million  285 11.6 56 14.6
¥10 million– 263 45.0 38 41.9
Total 17,802 100.2 1,835 99.9
[2] 1934
All joint-stock Listed joint-stock  Ordinary banks companies companies
Number of Composition Number of Composition Number of Composition
companies ratio of capital companies ratio of capital banks ratio of capital
(percent) (percent) (percent)
–¥100,000 10,113 1.8 3 0.0 0 0.0
¥100,000–500,000 7,195 6.6 44 0.2 0 0.0
¥500,000–1 million 1,851 5.4 72 0.7 132 4.0
¥1–5 million 2,106 18.7 229 7.9 277 24.3
¥5–10 million 310 9.6 116 10.0 30 10.5
¥10–50 million 
402 58.0
158 33.2 38 29.0
¥50 million–

47 48.1 6 32.2
Total

21,977 100.1 669 100.1 483 100.0
Note: Composition ratio of the listed joint-stock companies is the ratio of the number of shares.
Classification by firm size is not consistent among the three sources of data, and adjustment 
has not been carried out. For example, companies with capital of ¥1 million are included in the
category of ¥1–5 million in Goto (1970) and Nihon Choki Tokei Soran (Historical Statistics 
of Japan), but in the category of ¥500,000–1 million in Masuji (1936).
Sources: Masuji (1936, p. 3), Goto (1970, p. 78), and Nihon Choki Tokei Soran, compiled by the Japan
Statistical Association, Vol. 4, p.174.listed companies were even larger during the period prior to the bank concentration
policy after the enactment of the Banking Law in 1928.
Because of this, during the period before World War II banks had little ability 
to reduce risk by diversifying borrowers. There were extremely large risks inherent in
the banking sector’s lending, and most of them were presumably borne by depositors.
The many financial crises that occurred during the prewar period demonstrate the 
high risks to which banks were exposed.
13 Bank information disclosure was extremely
inadequate prior to the enactment of the Banking Law. Looking back, it seems that 
prewar depositors must have been fully aware of the risks to which banks were exposed
when they chose to hold their money as bank deposits. Tables 9 and 10 contain asset
structures for the private nonfinancial sector and illustrate the importance of risk-
taking by depositors in the prewar period. In Table 9, the ratio of bank and postal
deposits to total private nonfinancial sector assets rises from 18.6 percent in 1886–90
to 43.3 percent in 1916–20 and remains at high levels thereafter.
14 Virtually the same
trends can be observed in Table 10’s flow-side values. The ratio is even larger when
fund-raising using financial-sector equities is added to the deployment of funds 
by banks. In Table 9, the share of deposits and financial-sector equities reaches 
46.0 percent between 1901 and 1905. In flow terms, the maximum level was 57.0 percent
between 1896 and 1900.
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13. Such financial crises include the following: (1) during the financial crisis of 1900–01, a total of 59 banks closed 
or suspended operations; (2) during the postwar depression of 1920, a total of 21 banks suspended operations; 
(3) during the financial crisis of 1922, a total of 11 banks suspended operations; and (4) during the financial 
depression of 1927, a total of 42 banks suspended operations, including the No. 15 Bank and the Bank of Taiwan.
14. On this point, it is worth looking at Ishii’s (1997) contention that banks played a major role. However, the 
problem remains that, by nature, the industrial revolution period was a time in which many new enterprises were
established and, as we have already seen, the role played by banks was mostly that of a supporting actor, supplying
supplemental operating capital and financing indigenous industries. During the 1920s, banks are said to have been
“paralyzed” (Ishii [1999]), but this period also saw the rapid growth of the trust banking and insurance sectors, and
Table 9  Assets in the Private Nonfinancial Sector (Composition Ratio) 
Average of the composition ratio of balances in the period, percent
Bank and  Domestic Equities
Cash postal Insurance government 
Total Financial Nonfinancial
Corporate Investments




1886–90 21.6 18.6 0.1 29.2 28.3 17.0 11.3 0.0 0.0
1891–95 21.4 20.9 0.2 19.2 31.7 13.4 18.3 1.0 0.0
1896–1900 16.4 26.2 0.5 13.7 36.1 15.1 21.0 1.3 4.3
1901–05 11.2 31.0 0.9 12.5 34.4 15.0 19.4 1.7 4.5
1906–10 8.4 34.8 1.2 17.5 25.3 10.5 14.8 1.8 4.8
1911–15 6.4 34.6 1.9 14.6 26.0 9.5 16.5 3.5 5.2
1916–20 5.0 43.3 1.9 8.3 28.2 7.2 21.0 3.1 4.3
1921–25 3.7 37.9 2.8 6.7 32.3 7.4 24.9 4.2 5.7
1926–30 2.5 37.9 7.6 6.1 28.3 5.9 22.4 4.0 6.3
1931–35 2.2 37.1 11.1 5.8 29.2 4.5 24.7 3.2 6.2
1936–40 2.9 41.6 12.2 5.4 27.6 2.6 25.0 2.4 4.2
Note: Stocks of the BOJ are included in the nonfinancial sector. The total for each period adds up to 100 percent.
Source: Fujino and Teranishi (2000, appendix).Now let us consider the role of the equity markets in resource allocation. Again,
information production is the first topic, about which the following point can be made:
(3) It is questionable whether the equity markets before World War II had sufficient
information on investment opportunities in the economy and were able to
reflect that information in share price formation.
During the period before World War II, the equity issuing market was under-
developed—indeed, only the secondary market was active (Shimura [1969])—and the
functioning of this secondary market was not necessarily adequate due to several
inherent characteristics. First, trading consisted of two different forms: spot trading
and “fixed-term trading,” a kind of futures trading that was settled by payment of 
differences. The majority of equity market trading was done on margin,
15 but unlike
current-day margin trading, was not backed up by underlying actual deliveries in any
form, making it extremely speculative. Because of this, when the market was cornered,
the number of shares purchased in the cornering operation could, in extreme cases,
exceed the number of shares actually issued. Second, the actual movement of shares
through the exchange—that is, the volume of spot trades and delivery settlements for
fixed-term trades—was less than 10 percent of total trading in Osaka and about 
30 percent of total trading in Tokyo. Spot deliveries were made almost exclusively off the
exchange. Third, the only shares traded on the exchanges were from large enterprises
such as the railways and marine transportation companies. Most other shares were
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given the funds intermediation function performed by these sectors in the form of contractual savings, it may not
be correct to argue that intermediary financing as a whole was “paralyzed.”
15. During the Meiji Period, at its peak spot trading accounted for about one-fourth of total trading on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange and less than 5 percent of total trading on the Osaka Stock Exchange.
Table 10  Assets in the Private Nonfinancial Sector (Flow)  
Composition ratio of flow in the period, percent
Bank and  Domestic Equities
Cash postal Insurance government 
Total Financial Nonfinancial
Corporate Investments




1887–90 22.0 17.8 0.2 –4.6 42.2 5.7 36.5 0.2 0.0
1891–95 16.8 33.6 0.8 5.6 32.9 5.8 27.1 3.7 0.0
1896–1900 5.2 35.3 1.2 3.5 43.1 21.7 21.4 1.7 9.8
1901–05 5.3 25.9 1.4 32.4 13.4 3.5 9.9 2.0 3.3
1906–10 2.5 38.4 2.0 11.8 20.3 5.9 14.4 3.4 7.0
1911–15 –1.7 44.5 5.3 1.9 31.2 9.3 21.9 10.0 4.9
1916–20 3.9 41.8 1.5 3.7 36.0 7.0 29.0 2.2 4.7
1921–25 1.6 29.7 10.3 7.9 22.6 5.0 17.6 9.0 8.9
1926–30 –4.1 40.3 30.7 –0.1 26.0 –2.1 28.1 0.2 8.0
1931–35 4.7 32.6 25.7 9.8 25.9 –1.6 27.5 –1.3 4.7
1936–40 3.6 57.8 10.4 4.0 21.2 –0.2 21.4 1.1 –0.4
Note: Stocks of the BOJ are included in the nonfinancial sector. The total for each period adds up to 100 percent.
Source: Fujino and Teranishi (2000, appendix).only traded off-exchange. In other words, the role of the exchanges in share price 
formation was extremely limited when viewed in terms of the entire equity market.
What these characteristics indicate is that share prices were formed randomly
through speculative fixed-term trading, and to that extent the equity market may have
been efficient. However, these prices did little to reflect the future earnings potential
of enterprises; prices were presumably formed based on information about individual
enterprises obtained personally by spot traders and investors. Kataoka, Maru, and
Teranishi (2004a, b) investigate the efficiency of share price formation using daily
price data for 29 spinning company stocks and 28 railway company stocks from
January 5 to December 29, 1900 and monthly share price data from January 1898 to
December 1903. Their work first considers whether there was autocorrelation in daily
share price rates of change (rates of return), and finds that the efficiency criterion 
was achieved during these periods just as it was during the postwar period—in other
words, there was limited scope to use correlation to achieve excess returns. Second,
their work finds that these periods do display different characteristics from analytical
results achieved for the postwar period, in that announced changes in the official 
discount rate were not necessarily immediately reflected in the rates of return on 
equities and corporate net profits only began to slowly influence the average cumulative
residual for equity rates of return after their disclosure. In other words, during the 
late Meiji Period, share prices did not necessarily have enough elasticity to reflect the
surprise effect from the official discount rate, nor did they reflect discount corporate
earnings forecasts prior to the disclosure of information.
The following point can be made regarding risk bearing by equity markets:
(4) Other than speculators engaging in fixed-term trading on secondary markets, the
investors in equity markets were merchants and landlords of substantial personal
wealth. They took sufficient risks when making their investments. However,
they took a negative view of participation by ordinary investors and tended to
share returns and risks only among a select group of existing shareholders.
The classic example is the zaibatsu. Zaibatsu families owned holding companies as
unlimited partners, and the holding companies kept the subsidiaries they owned closed
and non-public. The assets were managed by the zaibatsu families.
16 The investment
activities of subsidiaries were closely monitored by the holding company and, until the
1920s, investments were made in principle only with funds that had been accumulated
within the zaibatsu. There were particularly strict head office controls on the intro-
duction of borrowings from outside (Miyajima [2003]). Opinions differ on the extent
to which zaibatsu families were involved in investment activities as part of the 
management of the zaibatsu,
17 but given their unlimited-liability status, it is certain
that the individualzaibatsu families were fully cognizant of the investment risks.
18
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16. It was only in 1937 that the first zaibatsu head offices were partially converted into joint-stock companies and
partners achieved limited-liability status.
17. Yasuoka (1998) emphasizes the family control structure, while Morikawa (1980) emphasizes the discretion afforded to
professional managers; Asajima (1983) and Okazaki (1999) highlight holding companies’ monitoring of subsidiaries.
18. Takeda (1995) and Miyajima (2003) argue that the unique soyu-sei (total ownership system) of the time increased
families’ awareness of risk—because they were unlimited partners—and also strengthened their voice in management.Although not to the same extent as the zaibatsu and other non-public enterprises,
even the publicly traded large enterprises had a strong tendency toward control by a
small group of existing shareholders. This is perhaps best illustrated by the mecha-
nisms used for capital increases at publicly traded enterprises. As Shimura (1969)
makes clear, capital increases during the period before World War II were almost
exclusively in the form of allocations of new shares at par to existing shareholders. The
reason for choosing allocation at par was in most cases to achieve founders’ profits,
but what is more important is that the allocation was made to existing shareholders
rather than publicly placed. As can be seen in Table 11, the ratio of publicly placed
capital increases was extremely low throughout the entire period from 1914 up to
World War II. The vast majority of capital increases were allocated to existing 
shareholders.
19 In the 1920s, capital increases due to merger accounted for a high
share, but by nature this was the same as an allocation to existing shareholders because
all it meant was a conversion of existing shares to shares in the merged company. 
This structure of dominance by a small group of existing shareholders also manifested
itself in the methods used to raise capital for newly established enterprises. Table 12
illustrates that most capital for new enterprises was raised by private placement.
20
Obviously, there were some public placements of new shares, and existing shares
were actively traded (mostly off-exchange), so there was an increase in the number of
shareholders. Table 13 shows that between 1920 and 1934 the number of postal 
saving accounts grew by 1.8 times and the number of bank accounts by 1.3 times, but
the number of shareholders in large companies grew by 3.4 times. However, despite
this expansion in the number of shareholders, the original shareholders were able to
continue to hold the reins of most companies, particularly controlling shareholders
and their associates.
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19. What is more, the enterprises themselves issued the new shares because banks and other financial institutions did
not offer underwriting services.
20. During the 1930s, companies accounted for a large proportion, but this reflects the rapid rise in the proportion of
corporate shareholders in large enterprises.
Table 11  Types of Additional Shares Issued by Leading Enterprises (402 Companies)
1914–17 1918–22 1923–27 1928–32 1933–37
Additional shares issued  387 2,497 1,459 967 3,928 (authorized capital, ¥ millions)
Composition ratio by type of additional shares issued (percent)
Mergers 1.9 15.3 34.1 37.9 9.0
Assignments to existing shareholders 72.7 67.8 52.5 54.8 68.9
Awards 0.2 1.4 2.8 1.1 1.4
Other assignments 4.7 2.9 2.4 1.3 9.5
Public issues 12.8 5.6 4.9 2.9 5.9
Unclassified 7.8 7.1 3.3 2.0 5.1
Note: Survey utilizing magazines, company histories, and other materials. Number of companies,
amounts of additional shares issued, and percentages of types are given in Shimura (1969).
Composition ratios for the periods are calculated using the estimated amount of each type based
on the percentage each year.
Source: Shimura (1969, p. 222).Two supplemental points should be made regarding these observations. The first
concerns the welfare implications of the funds flowing through equity markets. In 
theory, a well-developed equity market should allocate funds to reflect the current and
future consumption preferences of the consumers (asset holders) in the economy. In
light of this, equity markets before World War II allocated funds to major enterprises
in a way that reflected the preferences of a limited number of wealthy individuals, 
and this determined the pattern of development for modern industries. Non-wealthy
individuals (consumers) held bank deposits and banks participated in investment 
activities within the economy by actively taking on risk, but their preferences were 
primarily reflected in the allocation of resources to indigenous production activities.
The second point concerns the function of equity-secured finance. Shares in the period
before World War II had high par values of ¥50 and ¥100, and common practice was
to pay capital in installments, with funds for such payment raised in the form of bank
loans secured with the shares. Ishii (1999) concludes from this that the fund-raising 
of large enterprises on the equity markets was supported by bank borrowings through
the mechanism of equity-secured finance, which implies that the focal point of the
financial system before World War II was the flow of funds through banks. However,
what is important concerning this point is that banks were unconcerned whether the
funds loaned against equities were used to pay for the equities or for other purposes.
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Table 12  Composition of Capital-Raising Methods of Newly Established Enterprises
Percent
1912–14 1915–19 1933–37
Founders, assentors, private subscription 64.0 78.2 19.9
Companies 13.6 14.8 48.9
Public subscription 7.0 4.4 3.8
Government —— 20.3
Other 15.4 2.7 7.1
Note: Composition ratio of capital-raising methods with regard to authorized capital. Investigation 
was carried out using magazines, company histories, and other materials. Samples were 
70 enterprises (capital ¥71 million) out of all newly established 1,019 enterprises (capital 
¥634 million) for 1912–14; 100 enterprises (capital ¥631 million) out of 6,309 enterprises 
(capital ¥4,543 million) for 1915–19; and 302 enterprises (capital ¥2,466 million) out of 
6,652 enterprises (capital ¥11,644 million) for 1933–37.
Source: Shimura (1969).
Table 13  Change in Number of Deposit Accounts and Shareholders
1920 1934
Number of postal saving accounts 24,102 43,618
Number of accounts in ordinary banks (thousands) 6,812 8,831
Number of shareholders in 10 major enterprises (thousands) 104 349
Note: Savings and installment deposit accounts are not included in the number of accounts in ordinary
banks. The 10 major enterprises consist of Tokyo Electricity, Daido Electricity, Nihon Hypothec
Bank, Osaka Merchant Marine, Toho Electricity, Nihon Oil, Nihon Yusen, Kawasaki Shipbuilding,
Nihon Electricity, and Minami-Manshu Railways. 
Sources: Goto (1970), Masuji (1936), and Yusei Hyakunen-Shi Shiryo (Materials for a Hundred-Year
History of Postal Services) compiled by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, Vol. 30.What this means is that, however it was financed, the allocation of investments to 
equities was a decision made by investors (households). Banks did not bear the risk 
of equity investments, but merely the risk of lending to investors. In that sense, the
argument that widespread equity-secured finance is grounds to discount the role 
played by equity markets is not necessarily supportable.
21
Still, it is extremely important that banks took the risk of lending to investors.
Funding for these loans came from micro-deposits, and depositors supplied funding
to large enterprises in the form of bank loans to investors. The risks borne by deposi-
tors were only the risks associated with the bank. Nonetheless, the flow of funds took
this route from micro-depositors to large enterprises. It is possible, therefore, that the
bulk of the loans from banks to merchants actually flowed into the large enterprise
sector in the form of equity investments.
22 In other words, this flow of funds implies
that Ishii’s (1999) argument regarding the importance of the bank-mediated circula-
tion of funds is justified. However, the argument invites confusion, because it focuses
only on the portion of the funds secured with equities.
B. Comparison of Roles in Corporate Governance
The next question to be considered is the role played by equity markets, banks, and
other financial institutions in governance mechanisms for major large enterprises in
the modern sector. The first point to be emphasized is as follows:
(5) Shareholders fundamentally played the lead role in the governance of large
enterprises.
As discussed above, the governance of the zaibatsu involved strong control by the
owner family. The holding company’s professional managers exerted strong leadership
over investment proposals, including the investment plans of subsidiaries, but the
intentions of the family were presumably given great weight in the approval of final
investment plans.
The same held true for major enterprises in light industrial sectors such as spinning,
papermaking, cement, and brewing (Miyajima [2003]). Most of these enterprises were
owned in the form of joint-investment companies by the merchants and manufacturers
involved in the relevant businesses, and decision-making was by agreement of the major
shareholders jointly invested in the company. The number of shareholders was limited,
and the general meeting of shareholders is known to have functioned effectively as a
forum for creating consensus (Kataoka [1988]).
As we have observed, capital increases by these large enterprises generally took 
the form of allocations of new shares to existing shareholders. What is more, equity
underwriting functions were undeveloped in Japan before World War II,
23 requiring
issuing enterprises to manage the entire process of new share issues, allocations, and
subsequent payments (Shimura [1969]). In part, this reflects the slowness of financial
institutions to take on investment banking functions, but much is also due to the strong
69
Were Banks Really at the Center of the Prewar Japanese Financial System?
21. This point owes much to comments provided by Shin’ichi Fukuda. See also Teranishi (1982, pp. 204–207).
22. It must also be remembered that a considerable portion of bank loans to merchants was re-lent to micro-producers.
23. Corporate and public bonds were actively underwritten by major banks and securities companies.desire of existing shareholders to retain control over the enterprise by maintaining 
their ownership ratios.
Now let us consider monitoring by banks:
(6) Banks are assumed to have had limited ability, as creditors, to provide monitoring
in the governance of large enterprises.
The largest factor in this was that banks’ position as “organ banks” ranked lower
on the hierarchy than the enterprises or enterprise groups they served. “Organ banks”
were established as conduits to raise funds for industry and enterprises by collecting
deposits from the general population. It has often been pointed out since Kato (1957)
that most banks during the period before World War II were of this nature. Under
this banking system, it was common for enterprises and banks to have not only 
interlocking shareholders, but also interlocking directors and managers. Connected
lending to shareholders and directors was rampant, and bank behavior was often 
contrary to the interests of depositors and outside (non-controlling) shareholders.
Miyajima (2003) examines Japanese enterprises during the period before World War II
from the perspective of major shareholder ownership ratios and manager ownership
ratios, categorizing them into three types: the three largezaibatsu (Mitsui, Mitsubishi,
and Sumitomo), publicly traded companies in light industries formed by joint 
investment, and entrepreneurial enterprises. He argues that the financing for entre-
preneurial enterprises was closely related to “organ banking.”
24 His entrepreneurial
enterprises consist primarily of the enterprises more commonly known as the “Taisho
zaibatsu” or the “new zaibatsu.” These enterprises had little separation of manage-
ment and ownership. Entrepreneurial managers instead used funding from agency
banks to engage in aggressive business activities. For these enterprises, banks were just
one member of the corporate group,
25 and their ability to monitor the enterprise was
probably quite limited.
On the other hand, cotton spinning and other light industries were the leading
Japanese industries at the time and had a high ability to raise funds, including 
short-term financing raised on the bill trading market. The same holds true of electric
power and other public service enterprises, which had the ability to raise funds on 
overseas markets with the issue of foreign currency-denominated bonds and therefore
had generally weak relationships with banks. Even within thezaibatsu, banks were not
necessarily central, because funding could be raised from the accumulations within the
group. If anything, banks served as the “external arm” of thezaibatsu (Shibagaki (1965]).
The conclusion from the above is that banks had only limited ability to monitor the
large enterprises to which they lent during the period before World War II.
This governance mechanism raises the question of the relationship between man-
agers, other employees, and shareholders in large enterprises during the period before
World War II. Did the controlling shareholder (owner) exercise dominant control, or
were there sharp conflicts between managers and owners, as appeared during the same
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24. Teranishi (2005b) provides a critical examination of Miyajima’s (2003) three-type hypothesis.
25. This is only a generalization. For example, the Bank of Taiwan was the “organ bank” for Suzuki Trading, one of
the most prominent of the newzaibatsu, but it cannot be considered a group subsidiary.period in the United States and which raised agency costs? In point of fact, the 
circumstances in Japan before World War II were different (Teranishi [2006]).
(7) Shareholders had final control in the large-enterprise governance structure, 
but rights to residual income and corporate control were gradually ceded to
professional managers and middle management.
Takahashi (1977) and Morikawa (1980) discuss the process by which the zaibatsu
ceded rights to residual income and corporate control to professional managers. Of 
particular note is the zaibatsu recruitment of senior government officials and the BOJ
elite who had received higher education. Thezaibatsu gave these professional managers
a great deal of discretion (although the family retained the ultimate decision-making
rights) and promised them large bonuses. One example is Hikojiro Nakamigawa, who
was educated in England and served in the Ministry of Industry and Ministry of
Finance before becoming president of the Sanyo railway company and then moving to
Mitsui. As managing director of Mitsui Bank, he demanded 10 percent of the bank’s
profits as a bonus.
26 The payment of large bonuses represents the ceding of rights to
residual income, and the drastic reforms undertaken by Nakamigawa at Mitsui Bank
hint that rights to residual control were indeed granted to him.
Rights to residual income and corporate control were also ceded to professional
managers at non-zaibatsu enterprises. For example, at cotton spinning enterprises, it
was initially common for major shareholders with management abilities to undertake
management of the enterprise, but there emerged a growing tendency to recruit 
professional managers from outside. In addition, these enterprises integrated boards of
directors and management teams to reduce the agency costs incurred by separating
ownership from management. For example, at Kanegafuchi Spinning (Kanebo), the
leading firm in cotton spinning, Sanji Muto, who was educated in the United States
and served as managing director and then president of Kanebo, revised the articles of
incorporation at the 1927 general meeting of shareholders to restrict the positions of
president and executive director to persons with at least five years of work history at
Kanebo and to require these directors to be employed at the positions full-time.
Similar reforms subsequently took place at other leading companies, including Toyo
Spinning, Kurashiki Spinning, Fuji Gas Spinning, and Nisshin Spinning (Yui [1995]).
It must be noted, however, that these organizational reforms were made at general
meetings of shareholders with the consent of shareholders.
27
In the 1920s, more white-collar, university-educated employees were hired and
rights to residual income and control were gradually ceded to them. These university-
educated employees were given a lifetime employment agreement and seniority 
wage system, and, as middle managers, they were allowed a great deal of discretion. In
manufacturing, factories had accounting, sales, and personnel sections similar to those
in the head office and a large amount of autonomy in their product development,
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26. Tentative calculations by the author indicate that, when disposing of current profits, zaibatsu paid out more in
director bonuses and less in dividends than non-zaibatsu.
27. Note also that Managing Director Toyoji Wada of Fuji Gas Spinning received a bonus of ¥300,000 in 1905, 
compared to the company’s net profit of ¥3 million for the year.process improvement, and materials sourcing. Becoming a section chief at a large 
factory was tantamount tobeing put on the executive track and the first step to future
membership in the management team.
Table 14 provides an illustration of the emergence of professional managers, 
integration of management teams and boards, and development of mechanisms for
internal promotion. As can be seen in panel (1), out of 75 companies in 1905, only
five had two or more professional managers, but by 1930, that number had risen to
113 out of 158. Panel (2) illustrates the integration of management teams and boards
of directors. Panel (3) shows the increase in the percentage of professional managers
gaining their position by means of internal promotion.
Teranishi (2006) notes that changes in the industrial structure and growing 
international competition raised the necessity of introducing new technologies and
that these organizational reforms, in which the shareholders (enterprise owners) ceded
residual control rights to employees and managers, enabled enterprises to avoid
“holdup problems” and provided incentives for them to develop firm-specific skills.
28
IV. Conclusions
Were banks really at the center of the Japanese financial system before World War II?
Our observations on this question are formulated in the five propositions of Section II
(quantitative aspects) and the seven propositions of Section III (qualitative aspects).
These 12 propositions can be summed up as follows.
First, the quantitative aspects. The capital markets, primarily the equity market,
played a major role in fund-raising for large enterprises. However, there is no indication
that their role grew in size and significance over time as posited in modernization 
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Table 14  Progression toward the Period of Professional Managers
1905 1915 1930
(1) Number of professional managers
Fewer than two persons 69 86 42
Two or more persons  5 29 113
Total number of enterprises 75 115 158
(2) Ratio of professional managers in directors
Less than one-third — 50 20
One-third or more — 19 45
Total number of enterprises — 69 65
(3) Career path of professional managers
Internal promotion 8 — 247
Intermediate recruitment or other 28 — 223
Total number of managers 36 — 470
Notes: 1. The table in Takeda (1995, p.141) based on Morikawa (1981, 1991) has been rearranged.
2. Total number of enterprises in (1) includes unclassified samples. Intermediate recruitment or
other in (3) includes temporary directors and unclassified samples.
28. Also refer to comments by Morck (2006).theory. The declining share of bank borrowings in private nonfinancial sector fund-
raising after World War I represents the waning of indigenous industries, which were
highly dependent on borrowings, in the macro-level industrial structure. On the other
hand, the mediated financial system of banks and others played a significant role in 
fund-raising at indigenous micro-producers and also in raising operating capital for
large enterprises, primarily in manufacturing. Nonetheless, the role of banks did not
increase over time in a manner that has continuity with the postwar period. The large-
enterprise sector as a whole did see an increase in its dependence on borrowings 
over time, but this is due to superficial reasons: manufacturing sectors, which were
highly dependent on borrowings from the beginning, began to account for a greater
share of the industrial structure than broadly defined public services, which relied 
more on equities.
Next, the qualitative aspects. Shareholders and personal investors played a major
role in supplying risk money in the economy before World War II. However, wealthy
individuals were the primary personal investors and tended to take risks based on 
information that was close at hand and that came from close associates, resulting in 
little movement toward public companies of the kinds seen in Europe and the United
States. Shareholders had ultimate control over large enterprises, but day-to-day 
managerial control was gradually ceded to professional and middle managers. At the
same time, banks’ qualitative capacities were extremely limited in the areas of enterprise
information accumulation, processing, and monitoring. Nonetheless, depositors 
supplied banks with what on the macro level were large amounts of funds, fully aware
of the risks inherent in banks as business entities. A portion of the deposits gathered by 
banks was directly lent as operating capital to indigenous industries and enterprises, while
part was lent to merchants and investors and used to finance the capital investments 
of large enterprises in the form of equity funding. In this sense, bank deposits likely
played a significant role in supplying risk money for economic development before
World War II.
Finally, we should comment on the remaining questions directly related to these
observations. The first question is the extent of the impact of the savings of micro-
producers and medium-level producers (most of which were presumably in the form
of deposits) in financing economic development before World War II. It is almost 
certain that the funds accumulated by landlords and merchants played a significant
role in funding the initial stages of Japanese economic development, but it is
extremely important to consider the role played by the savings of other groups when
discussing the evolving patterns of capitalism. Ishii (1997, 1999) argues that savings
accumulated in the form of bank deposits supported the production of capital by
major shareholders and large enterprises, and that the key mechanism in this was
equity-secured finance. On the other hand, Teranishi (1989), Okazaki, Sawada, and
Yokoyama (2005), and other studies argue that the increase in savings held by the 
middle class during the interwar period weakened bank monitoring and impaired the
functioning of the bank-centered financial system. The second issue to be raised is the
constant change undergone by systems, whether securities or banking. For simplicity’s
sake, this paper did not touch on this topic to a significant degree in the discussion of
qualitative aspects, but this is an important remaining issue. It is worth noting that
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in the functioning of equity markets during and after the interwar period, particularly
in the listing system and exchange trading. On the other hand, Teranishi (1989),
Okazaki, Sawada, and Yokoyama (2005), and others argue that the elimination of
“organ banking” resulted in significant functional gains for the banking system. These
institutional evolutions need to be considered in more detail.
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